Still Misinterpreting Lie Scales: Reply to Feldman’s Rejoinder by de Vries, R.E. et al.
VU Research Portal
Still Misinterpreting Lie Scales: Reply to Feldman’s Rejoinder





Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
de Vries, R. E., Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., Dunlop, P. D., Holtrop, D. J., Kibeom, L., & Ashton, M. C. (2018). Still
Misinterpreting Lie Scales: Reply to Feldman’s Rejoinder. 1-8.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 13. Sep. 2021
Misinterpreting Lie Scales 1 
 
Still Misinterpreting Lie Scales: Reply to Feldman’s Rejoinder 
 
De Vries, R. E., Hilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., Dunlop, P. D., Holtrop, D., Lee, K., & Ashton, M. 
C. (2018). Still Misinterpreting Lie Scales: Reply to Feldman’s Rejoinder. Amsterdam: Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam 
 
Reinout E. de Vries 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and University of Twente, the Netherlands 
Benjamin E. Hilbig 
University of Koblenz-Landau, Germany 
Ingo Zettler 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
Patrick D. Dunlop & Djurre Holtrop 
University of Western Australia, Australia 
Kibeom Lee 
University of Calgary, Canada 
Michael C. Ashton 
Brock University, Canada 
 
Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to Reinout E. de Vries, Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam, Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Van der 
Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, tel: +31-20-5988718, e-mail: 
re.de.vries@vu.nl 
Misinterpreting Lie Scales 2 
 
Abstract 
Despite convincing counterevidence, misinterpretation of so-called Impression Management, 
Social Desirability, or Lie scales in low-stakes settings seems to persist. In this reply to an 
ongoing discussion with Feldman and colleagues (De Vries et al., 2017; Feldman, in press; 
Feldman et al., 2017), we argue that high scores on Impression Management and Lie scales in 
low-stakes settings are more likely to reflect honesty than dishonesty. Specifically, we point 
out (1) that there is no evidence of a relation between Impression Management and (in-
)authenticity, (2) that respondents in anonymous online studies have no reason to be 
inauthentic, and (3) that laypersons’ judgments about Lie scale responses (especially 
responses that are extremely rare) are uninformative and thus yield no insight on the construct 
validity of the Lie scale. We finally reiterate the warning that conclusions based on the 
incorrect interpretation of Impression Management, Social Desirability, or Lie scales in low-
stakes settings are invalid.  
 
Keywords: Honesty, Authenticity, Lie scale, Impression Management, Social Desirability, 
Unlikely Virtues 
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The interpretation of Impression Management (IM), Social Desirability, and Lie 
scales has been a contentious issue among researchers. In line with the initial idea of such 
scales, some researchers continue to claim that responding ‘yes’ on items such as ‘Do you 
always practice what you preach’ and ‘no’ on items such as ‘Have you ever cheated at a 
game?’ (two items of the Lie scale; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985) are indicative of 
dishonesty (Feldman et al., 2017; and hence the label ‘Lie scale’), even in in low-stakes 
settings that provide little to no incentives for faking or dishonesty. We maintain that a 
tendency to affirm desirable (i.e., normative or moral) behaviors and a tendency to deny 
undesirable (i.e., counternormative or immoral) behaviors in low-stakes settings are more 
likely to be indicative of honesty instead (e.g., De Vries et al., 2017; De Vries, Zettler, & 
Hilbig, 2014; Zettler, Hilbig, Moshagen, & De Vries, 2015). Here, we illustrate why 
Feldman’s (in press; Feldman et al., 2017) interpretation of Eysenck et al.’s (1985) Lie scale 
does not hold and why the resulting continued misinterpretation of Lie/IM scales in research 
and practice is worrisome. 
In Study 1 of Feldman’s et al. (2017) original article, high scores on the Lie scale 
(that is, a tendency to affirm virtuous behaviors) were interpreted in terms of low rather than 
high honesty. ‘Honesty’ thus defined was positively related to profanity use, which 
constituted the main message of Feldman et al. (2017). In our comment (De Vries et al., 
2017), we presented evidence showing that (1) self- and other ratings on Lie/IM scales are 
positively related; (2) Lie/IM scales are positively related to trait Honesty-Humility (in self- 
and other ratings); and (3) scores on the IM scale and in particular on the item “I never 
swear” (indicative of low profanity use) are negatively—instead of positively—related to 
objective behavioral indicators of dishonesty.1 These findings corroborate our conclusion 
that—at least in low-stakes settings—high Lie/IM scale scores are better interpreted in terms 
of honesty than in terms of dishonesty. 
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In response, Feldman (in press) stressed two main points: (1) high scores on the Lie 
scale should be interpreted as reflecting an inauthentic kind of dishonesty instead of an 
unethical kind of dishonesty and (2) laypersons interpret an extremely high Lie score profile 
as less honest than an extremely low Lie score profile.  
With respect to the first point, Feldman (in press) did not provide any empirical 
evidence involving authentic honesty, which he defines as “being honest about and true to 
oneself” (p. 6). On the contrary, available evidence does not support a negative relation 
between authenticity and the Lie scale. In Wood et al. (2008), Authentic Living, defined as 
“behaving and expressing emotions in such a way that is consistent with the conscious 
awareness of physiological states, emotions, beliefs, and cognitions” (p. 386, sample items: “I 
live in accordance with my values and beliefs” and “I am true to myself in most situations”) 
was essentially uncorrelated with IM (r = .05). Furthermore, the data in Study 1 of Feldman 
et al.’s (2017) target article were obtained in a low-stakes MTurk sample, in which 
respondents did not have any reason to be inauthentic. MTurk respondents frequently fill out 
surveys (Stewart et al., 2015), the results of which are not fed back to anybody interested in 
them personally. Consequently, there is no reason for MTurk respondents to self-promote “to 
appear more desirable to others” (Feldman et al., 2017; p. 8, italics added) and thus it would 
require far stronger evidence to falsify the more plausible assumption that Lie scales in such 
low-stakes (or rather: ‘no-stakes’) settings reflect authentic responses to questions about 
virtuous behaviors. 
With respect to the second point, the alleged evidence is, unfortunately, entirely 
uninformative because it refers to laypersons’ judgments of Lie scale scores, and, in 
particular, an extremely uncommon maximum Lie scale score. Specifically, laypersons 
indicated the truthfulness of an extremely low or extremely high Lie scale score. A maximum 
score on the Lie scale is extremely rare, which makes it easy to imagine why respondents 
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might consider it untrustworthy. In the De Vries et al. (2014) study, no single individual 
(0.00%) obtained the maximum possible IM score. In the study by Feldman et al. (2017), 
only three out of 307 respondents (0.98%) obtained the maximum Lie scale score.2 Whatever 
the reasons for these three responses, correlations observed between the Lie scale and 
convergent constructs (e.g., Honesty-Humility; see De Vries et al., 2014) and criteria (e.g., 
actual cheating; see Zettler et al., 2015) are not driven by participants with such extreme 
scores. But more fundamentally, Feldman’s (in press) findings that laypersons did interpret 
high scorers on the Lie scale to be less truthful is largely irrelevant to the construct validity of 
the scale—although it may explain why misconceptions of the Lie scale have persisted 
despite repeated warnings and growing counterevidence. The only way to examine the 
construct validity of the Lie scale is to correlate it with other measures of honesty (either 
ethical or authentic) using a variety of methods, such as self-reports, other reports, and 
objective measures, which all point to an interpretation equating high Lie scale scores to 
higher levels of honesty in low-stakes settings. 
We should stress that our interpretation of the Lie scale has a strong basis in 
common sense. That is, people who claimed in Feldman et al.’s (2017) study to be virtuous 
(i.e., had high Lie scale scores) were found to claim that they do not often use profanities, 
self-reported using fewer swear words, and self-reported fewer swear words that they liked. 
A profanity use item ‘I never swear’ is actually part of the IM scale (Paulhus, 2002), a scale 
which is virtually identical—after correction for attenuation—to Eysenck et al.’s (1985) Lie 
scale. When following the IM and Lie scale logic, self-reports of lower profanity use in 
Feldman et al.’s (2017) study should thus be interpreted as reflecting lower levels of honesty, 
and thus should be indicative of higher profanity use instead! Note that when reversing the 
interpretation of both the Lie scale and the profanity use scale, honesty is negatively related 
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to profanity use, a position that we would endorse, even though we would disagree with the 
reversed interpretations. 
Although we agree with Feldman (in press) that the interpretation of Impression 
Management, Social Desirability, or Lie scales is interesting and worthy of research, we must 
stress that all the available evidence—including the plausibility of assumptions made on how 
people respond to questions in low-stakes settings—contradicts that higher scores on Lie/IM 
scales are indicative of dishonesty. Lie scales are likely to be misinterpreted in research, as in 
Feldman et al. (2017), and misused in practice (see De Vries et al. (2014), for an example), 
resulting in even stronger misrepresentations in the media or—worse—in assessments of real 
people, something we all should be wary of. 
Footnotes 
1 Taken together, the evidence suggests that (close) others are very well able to 
estimate whether somebody is likely to be high on dispositional honesty or not. Although it is 
probably true that close acquaintances are not much better at detecting experimentally 
induced dishonest behaviors in family members or partner/friends than are strangers (e.g., 
Morris et al., 2016), all evidence suggests that close others are better at estimating the 
likelihood (i.e., not necessarily specific instances) of naturally occurring dishonest behaviors 
(e.g., De Vries, Lee, & Ashton, 2008; Lee & Ashton, 2017). 
2 Any of these three may have been due to dissimulation (but more likely for other reasons 
than to ‘appear more desirable to others’), but it may also be true that such uncommon 
responses reflect genuine piety or some form of autism which actually make people never 
cheat, lie, or swear (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2007). Based on the extremely small subsample, it is 
impossible to tell. 
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